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Two internal critiques of  
political constitutionalism
Marco Goldoni*
The antagonism between legal and political constitutionalism has almost monopolized the 
discussion on constitutional theory during the last years. For this reason, political consti-
tutionalism has been assessed mainly as an alternative to legal constitutionalism. Moving 
beyond this perspective, this article intends to focus exclusively on political constitutionalism 
and its internal tensions. After having outlined the main tenets of  this theory, two internal 
critiques are put forward, both concerning the understanding of  the political aspect of  consti-
tutionalism: first, political constitutionalists propose a reductive account of  the principle of  
political equality; second, their exclusive focus on ordinary politics as the centre of  constitu-
tional life is misleading and precludes a correct evaluation of  constitutional politics.
Introduction
This article intends to put forward two internal critiques to a cluster of  works whose 
core theoretical proposal is known as political constitutionalism.1 Political constitu-
tionalists are those authors who have stressed, in particular during the last decade, 
the perils of  adopting a strong form of  judicial review to protect individual rights2 at 
the national and transnational levels.3 This process of  juridification, advocated by the 
* Centre for Law and Cosmopolitan Values, University of  Antwerp. The research for this article has been 
generously supported by an Odysseus grant of  the FWO (Research Foundation Flanders). Email: marco.
goldoni@gmail.com.
1 This expression is used by RichaRd Bellamy, Political constitutionalism (2007), and adam tomkins, ouR 
RePuBlican constitution (2005). Among the works that can be ascribed to the canon of  political constitu-
tionalism, at least two should be noted: JeRemy WaldRon, laW and disagReement (1999) and maRk tushnet, 
taking the constitution aWay fRom the couRts (1999). Tushnet refers to a political approach to constitu-
tionalism in maRk tushnet, the constitution of the united states of ameRica: a contextual analysis (2008), 
but it is necessary to point out that his version of  political constitutionalism is embedded in the American 
model of  strict separation of  powers. Of  course, the works that I group here diverge on certain issues 
(some claim to belong to republican theory, some to liberalism or democratic theory), but this is true for 
almost every family of  political philosophy.
2 The main focus of  political constitutionalism is on judicial review of  rights rather than structural judicial 
review (e.g., conflict among powers). See Adrienne Stone, Judicial Review Without Rights: Some Problems 
for the Democratic Legitimacy of  Structural Judicial Review, 28 oxfoRd J. legal stud. 1 (2008).
3 The most recent accomplished example being Jeremy Waldron, The Core of  the Case Against Judicial Review, 
115 yale L.J. 1346 (2006) [hereinafter The Core of  the Case].
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Two internal critiques of  political constitutionalism 927
so-called new constitutionalism,4 has also been severely criticized for its depoliticizing 
effects. But this point does not exhaust the depth and scope of  the theory of  political 
constitutionalism. The basis of  this approach must be found in a different understand-
ing of  the relationship between constitutional law and politics.5 This article focuses 
especially on this aspect of  political constitutionalism. Its aim is specifically to show 
that some of  the foundational tenets of  political constitutionalism are presented at 
best in a reductive way. Since the political critique of  judicial review has already been 
dealt with by several authors,6 this article will concentrate mainly on other aspects 
of  political constitutionalism. However, the critiques presented here do not arise from 
the point of  view of  an external observer, but from an internal perspective that accepts 
some of  the main features of  political constitutionalism. In a nutshell: the politics put 
forward by political constitutionalists needs to be supplemented and depicted in a 
more accurate and, as it were, deeper way.
To prove this point, this article proceeds in the following way. The first section out-
lines the main tenets of  political constitutionalism, so as to arrive at a general under-
standing of  the principles of  this stream of  thought. Section 2 evaluates the way 
political constitutionalists theorize and apply the basic normative principle of  political 
equality. In particular, two points are examined: the political conception of  the idea of  
public reason and the exclusive focus on the right to vote. Section 3 is concerned with 
the weaknesses of  the political conception of  the constitution as a process rather than 
as a norm and, accordingly, of  how this theory portrays higher law one-sidedly as an 
essentially juridified concept. This critique recognizes the valuable aspects of  certain 
tenets of  political constitutionalism; nonetheless, it puts forward the hypothesis that 
if  political constitutionalism wants to take things like rights, political equality and 
constitutionalism seriously,7 it needs to introduce other elements into the picture of  
politics and its relationship with constitutional law.
Overall, the problem affecting some of  the political constitutionalists’ proposals 
is that the idea of  politics undergirding this theory appears to be largely incomplete 
at least under two aspects with which this article deals in sections 2 and 3. The first 
aspect concerns the pillar of  political equality; the second—the temporal-extended 
dimension of  political action, which is all but ignored by political constitutionalists, 
even when they concentrate on the parliamentary style of  politics. It is unrealistic 
4 See miguel caRBonell ed., teoRia del neoconstitucionalismo [The Theory of  New Constitutionalism] (2007); 
Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of  Politics Worldwide, 75 foRdham l. Rev. 721 
(2006).
5 On this relationship see maRtin loughlin, sWoRd and scales. an examination of the RelationshiP BetWeen laW 
and Politics (2000).
6 The following is not an exhaustive list: Lars Vinx, Constitutional Indifferentism and Republican Freedom, 38 
Pol. theoRy 809 (2010); Alec Walen, Judicial Review in Review: A Four-Part Defense of  Legal Constitutionalism, 
7 int’l J. const. l. 329 (2009); Tom Hickman, In Defence of  the Legal Constitution, 55 univ. toRonto l.J. 
981 (2005); Iseult Honohan, Republicans, Rights, and Constitutions: Is Judicial Review Compatible with 
Republican Self-Government?, in legal RePuBlicanism 83 (Samantha Besson & José Luiss Martí eds., 2009); 
Paul Craig, Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in effective Judicial RevieW: a coRneRstone of good 
goveRnance 19 (Christopher Forsyth ed., 2010).
7 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 156.
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to portray political action as free from formal and material constraints. As any 
other practice, political action does not take place in a vacuum. And even though 
judicial reasoning may be performed in a more constrained environment, neither 
is politics exempt from a series of  temporal and immanent limits. For these reasons, 
the ideas of  political equality and of  a constitution cannot be set uniquely against 
the model proposed by legal constitutionalism. They need to be further developed 
in order to fulfill some of  the promises that political constitutionalism carries with 
it. One of  the assumptions underlying the political constitutionalists’ enterprise is, 
for example, the belief  that parliamentary sovereignty and a constitution under-
stood as a process are enough to get around the pitfalls of  neoliberalism and pro-
vide a political space for the expansion of  liberties and rights.8 Unfortunately, such 
a model rests on contentious premises about political power. This means that politi-
cal constitutionalists’ claims are often too optimistic and too generous toward the 
status quo.
This article hopes to convey a different and more nuanced argument: recognizing 
the value of  voting and of  parliamentary politics should not inhibit us from recogniz-
ing the redemptive potential of  other kinds of  politics. Quite the contrary: an enriched 
conception of  political action may bring with it a re-definition of  the right to vote and 
of  the centrality of  the legislature without adopting a strong anti-constitutionalist 
stance. It is in the spirit of  an internal critique of  political constitutionalism that some 
remarks are offered in the conclusion.
1. The model of  political constitutionalism: four tenets
In this section, the main tenets of  the model of  political constitutionalism will be 
sketched out in order to bring out their common theoretical core. This does not claim 
to be a complete or exhaustive list, but an attempt to carve out a common ground from 
different versions of  political constitutionalism.
1.1. The primacy of  politics: disagreement and rights
The foundational aspects of  this doctrine boil down to four tenets. According to the 
first one, politics precedes and founds law. The recognition of  this foundational trait 
renders the position of  political constitutionalists quite original in two ways. First, legal 
and constitutional theorists have focused on the question of  the relationship between 
morality and law, a question that, since the debate between Fuller and Hart, has never 
8 This idea has been expressed by Keith Ewing with reference to the British constitution: “for those wish-
ing to promote social change, the British constitution provided one of  the best opportunities for this to 
be done, particularly after the introduction of  universal suffrage and the reform of  the House of  Lords in 
1911 and 1949 . . . there were no institutional restraints on a legally sovereign legislature and a politic-
ally sovereign electorate”: Keith Ewing, The Unbalanced Constitution, in scePtical essays on human Rights 
104 (Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins eds., 2001). For a critique of  the ancillary role of  
constitutionalism in the raise of  the neoliberal doctrine see danny nicol, the constitutional PRotection of 
caPitalism (2010).
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ceased to be at the center of  contemporary legal philosophy.9 Seen from the perspective 
of  morality, politics looks inferior and potentially dangerous. In a well-known study on 
the mentality of  liberal legalism, Judith Shklar aptly summarized this view: “politics 
is regarded not only as something apart from law, but as inferior to law. Law aims at 
justice, while politics looks only to expediency. The former is neutral and objective, the 
latter the uncontrolled child of  competing interests and ideologies.”10 While moral-
ity is mainly associated with rationality, politics is depicted as the realm of  interests 
or passions,11 inevitably inferior to the ambit of  rationality.12 Law should be inspired 
by morality, and politics should be practiced only within the realm designed by legal 
norms. In a nutshell, politics is made possible only by the previous recognition of  a 
series of  fundamental legal and moral principles.13 Political and legal authority should 
be judged according to substantive moral outcomes.
Political constitutionalists try to turn this approach on its head and to establish at 
least the relative primacy of  politics. This move implies shifting the focus from morality 
to politics by adopting an agnostic attitude toward morality: Political constitutional-
ists do not take any specific stance concerning the nature and the knowledge of  moral 
values. Moral objectivity is, for them, irrelevant.14 This position entails that in poli-
tics (and in law, too) there is no privileged access to knowledge.15 In epistemic terms, 
this means that no institutional actor can claim to possess the best way to detect or 
track moral truths more accurately. The primacy of  the political comes as a necessary 
assumption grounded on what are known to be the two “circumstances of  politics.”16 
The first one is the recognition that the human condition is marked by radical plural-
ity (to be distinguished from the fact of  pluralism) because, as Hannah Arendt puts it, 
“not man but men inhabit the earth and form a world between them.”17 The second 
circumstance is constituted by the presence of  a pervasive reasonable disagreement 
as a logical consequence of  this plurality. The challenge of  politics is to find a way to 
reach an authoritative decision despite this immanent disagreement.18
No wonder, therefore, that disagreement is at the forefront of  the concerns of  politi-
cal constitutionalists. The recognition of  its importance runs parallel to the downplay-
ing of  consent as the grounds of  constitutional legitimacy. Disagreement and conflict 
are at the core of  politics; but at the same time political constitutionalists believe that 
9 See PeteR cane, ed., haRt–fulleR deBate in the tWenty-fiRst centuRy (2010) for the most recent contribution 
to this debate.
10 Judith shklaR, legalism 111 (1964).
11 This is a sketchy presentation that does not give justice to the complexities of  the argument.
12 The trope reason/passion fits very well in liberal constitutionalism. The topic has been neglected by con-
stitutional and political theorists, but it may lead to some interesting insights.
13 See, e.g., geoRge letsas, a theoRy of inteRPRetation of the euRoPean convention of human Rights (new edn. 
2009).
14 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 164–187.
15 On the objectivity of  legal knowledge, see geoRge Pavlakos, ouR knoWledge of the laW (2007).
16 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 108–113; alBeRt Weale, democRacy 8–13 (1999).
17 hannah aRendt, on Revolution 175 (1963).
18 For a normative account of  the role of  disagreement in law see samantha Besson, the moRality of conflict. 
ReasonaBle disagReement and the laW (2005).
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politics itself  represents the best way to deal with them. Law, in this scheme, is only 
one of  the possible tools that politics has at its disposal for managing conflict and dis-
agreement. The authority of  a constitutional order cannot be based on conventions 
or on moral principles (as it is in Dworkin’s interpretivism). The former presupposes 
at least tacit consent to follow the relevant legal conventions.19 The latter buttresses a 
form of  moral objectivity that is ill-fitting when one thinks of  the role of  disagreement 
in political life. Likewise, deliberative democracy cannot constitute a viable alternative 
for grounding a political conception of  authority. Deliberative theorists, too, look for 
a rational procedure to enhance the integrating force of  communication and bring to 
an ideal consensus, but for these theorists (and this is where they diverge from political 
constitutionalists) the presence of  disagreement, at the end of  the deliberative process, 
represents the sign of  failure.20
Disagreement is not only an essential feature of  the political condition. It also has 
jurisgenerative properties. In this sense, political constitutionalists believe that there 
is a mutual relationship between law and disagreement. Law has a role to play in 
coping with disagreement; but disagreement remains a creative force which brings 
with it many positive effects, such as plurality of  opinions, epistemological benefits, 
mutual learning, and political accountability through constant challenges to political 
power.21 This means that disagreement needs to be limited but must not be eliminated 
from political life.
Seen in the light of  pervasive reasonable disagreement, it should be clear that the 
main good to be protected in a constitutional polity, i.e., individual rights, also remain 
subject to the political circumstances. Indeed, the content of  rights is open to con-
testation as much as any other political question.22 Here, the separation between 
legal and political models of  constitutionalism is neat.23 In the legal model of  con-
stitutionalism, fundamental rights precede the political process and are entrenched 
in a constitution or in a declaration of  rights. People can enter the political process 
insofar they are endowed with certain rights which lie outside the realm of  politics. 
As these rights are recognized as being evident on the basis of  reason or as natural 
rights, their content should not be left to the bargaining that typically characterizes 
political decision-making. More specifically, rights are considered to trump notions 
such as public or common good whose appropriate sphere is politics. A strong indi-
vidualistic perspective animates this view on rights which are considered as individual 
good. As such, they should not be left to the exclusive protection of  legislation which is 
more prone to be guided by utilitarian considerations in its decision-making process. 
But if  disagreement is an inherent feature of  social life, then it must extend to cover 
19 But for an exception in the realm of  legal conventionalism see andRei maRmoR, laW and the oBJectivity of 
laW 5 (2001). Marmor rightly explains that the depiction of  conventionalism as a doctrine of  consent is 
due to Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 114–150 (2d edn. 1998).
20 See, e.g., the articles collected in Jon elsteR ed., deliBeRative democRacy (1998).
21 Besson, supra note 18, at 116–118.
22 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for having pointed out the opportunity to underline this point.
23 On the use of  models as applied in the debate on political constitutionalism see Graham Gee & Grégoire 
Webber, What is a Political Constitution?, 30 oxfoRd J. legal stud. 273 (2010).
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individual rights. It must be remarked that, with some notable exceptions,24 the theory 
proposed by political constitutionalists is often rights-based. Their account of  rights 
is not conceived in an individualistic fashion, but sees them as common goods. For 
legal constitutionalists, rights usually serve individual interests and shield them from 
the government, while for political constitutionalists rights also—or rather, primar-
ily—protect the common good.25 As noted by a liberal perfectionist like Joseph Raz, 
the right to freedom of  expression is prized and valuable because it contributes to an 
open and tolerant society based on democracy, and this is a common good for all citi-
zens, whether or not politically active.26 In that respect, contra Dworkin, “rights do not 
‘trump’ notions of  the collective good because they only make sense in so far as they 
contribute to that good and provide a suitable range of  individual opportunities for all 
members of  the community.”27 If  rights were regarded as absolute, it would make no 
sense to plead for a political interpretation because they would not be negotiable and 
open to compromise.28 As such, the best method to interpret and implement rights 
is to leave the determination of  their content to the political process. Courts cannot 
claim an epistemic primacy in the adjudication of  rights, certainly not superiority over 
the capacity of  legislatures.29
Viewed from the perspective of  disagreement’s role in law, judicial review of  rights 
entails at least two problems.30 The first one is that it shows a lack of  respect for indi-
vidual citizens by circumscribing the issue of  the determination of  the content of  
rights within the perimeter of  its own jurisdiction. Waldron has noted the fact that 
leaving the enforcement of  rights to processes of  legal interpretation can bring about 
undesirable side-effects: “it is sometimes liberating to be able to discuss issues like 
abortion directly, on the principles that ought to be engaged, rather than having to 
scramble around constructing those principles out of  scraps of  some sacred text, in a 
tendentious exercise of  constitutional calligraphy.”31 A discourse on rights based only 
on their purely legal dimension weakens the vitality of  the political debate because 
it turns out that “to embody a right in an entrenched constitutional document is to 
adopt a certain attitude towards one’s fellow citizens. That attitude is best summed up 
as a combination of  self-assurance and mistrust.”32 In other words, judicial review of  
rights does not respect citizens as people capable of  political judgment on fundamental 
24 Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 texas l. Rev. 1363 (1984).
25 For an overview on the debate on the nature of  rights see JeRemy WaldRon ed., theoRies of Rights (1984); 
PeteR Jones, Rights (1994); tom camPBell, Rights. a cRitical intRoduction (2006).
26 JosePh Raz, ethics in the PuBlic domain 146 (1995).
27 Id. Dworkin’s account of  rights has changed over time. On this point see Paul Yowell, A Critical Examination 
of  Dworkin’s Theory of  Rights, 52 am. J. JuRis. 93 (2007).
28 See gRégoiRe WeBBeR, the negotiaBle constitution (2009). On the role of  compromise in political constitu-
tionalism see RichaRd Bellamy, liBeRalism and PluRalism. toWaRds a Politics of comPRomise 93–114 (1999).
29 Jeremy Waldron, Judges as Moral Reasoners, 7 int’l J. const. l. 2 (2009).
30 Political constitutionalists have given other reasons to reject strong judicial review. These reasons will be 
discussed in section 1.3. Here, only the reasons against judicial review of  legislation based on the import-
ance of  disagreement are treated.
31 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 290–291.
32 Id., at 221.
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questions such as the content of  rights.33 The second problem affects the epistemic 
advantages that might be generated by political decisions regarding rights. In particu-
lar, by taking disagreement out of  the political sphere, judicial review reduces con-
stitutional adjudication of  rights to adversarial litigation and prevents the plurality 
of  opinions on the content of  the contested rights from expressing itself. In this way, 
rights are not decided upon following a proper consideration of  the plurality of  per-
spectives entailed by the circumstances of  politics.34 This is detrimental to the pub-
lic interest which should constitute, according to the political approach, the reason 
for enforcing rights. Since, for political constitutionalists, the best way to track the 
public interest is to let the plurality of  views on an issue express itself, decisions on 
rights (since these are a common good) should be taken following the same process. 
To sum up: Judicial review is not the best watchdog of  rights because it violates the 
most important of  them: the right to equal participation.35 This brings us to the sec-
ond tenet of  political constitutionalism.
1.2. Political equality
Given the role of  disagreement in politics outlined above, the only possible principle 
on which to ground authority is political equality. As a condition of  legitimacy and, 
as we shall see, a guide to judgment, political equality is the reference point around 
which political constitutionalism defines its goals and its language. It is both the 
engine of  the democratic process and the mirror that reflects the citizens’ critical judg-
ment. While equality before the law (isonomia) is certainly to be counted among the 
founding principles of  legal constitutionalism, political equality as the equal chance to 
have one’s voice heard (isegoria) constitutes the building block of  democratic politics. 
The key determinant of  political equality is clearly the right to vote.36 But political 
equality is respected only if  the vote carries an equal weight: one head, one vote.37 
Moreover, in order to let everybody have an equal say on common matters, one has 
to adopt the principle of  majority rule. These two aspects are to be applied to both the 
level of  general elections and of  parliamentary debate. Contrary to what is usually 
assumed, the justification of  majority rule is not to be found in the utilitarian idea that 
33 Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.u.l. Rev. 335, 353 (2009).
34 This criticism does not consider the use of  proportionality in European case law. For a concise, yet effec-
tive treatment of  the rationality underlying proportionality analysis see Mattias Kumm, Institutionalising 
Socratic Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of  Judicial 
Review, 1 euR. J. legal stud. 2 (2007).
35 Waldron defines this right as “a right to participate on equal terms in social decisions on issues of  high 
principle”: laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 213.
36 Political constitutionalists seem to ignore the status of  those who have not the right to vote (i.e., residents 
and aliens but not citizens), but they are nonetheless affected by political decisions. This lacuna can be 
explained by reducing the idea of  citizenship to the “right to have rights.” This issue can not be treated 
adequately here and will be discussed in another paper. For an introduction to the problem of  citizenship 
in contemporary constitutional law see the issue The Evolving Concept of  Citizenship in Constitutional Law, 
8 int.’l J. const. l. 6 (2010).
37 See, for a different view that takes into account the intellectual capacities of  citizens, J.S. Mill, Considerations 
on Representative Government [1861], in on liBeRty and otheR essays 205 (2008).
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this institution permits the aggregation of  preferences.38 But if  the political process 
is understood as aggregation of  preferences, then, as David Estlund has pointed out, 
even a clever dictator may accurately track the preference profile of  the electorate, but 
this would not make him democratically legitimate.39
On the contrary, political constitutionalists ground the justification of  the majority 
rule principle in the “equal distribution of  decision-making power.”40 In that sense, 
Waldron has reminded us that equal votes and majority rule show equal concern and 
respect for citizens:
majority-decision respects individuals in two ways. The first is by respecting the fact of  their dif-
ferences of  opinion about justice and the common good. Majority-decision does not require any-
one’s view to be played down or hushed up because of  the fancied importance of  consensus.41
The second way of  showing respect in a majority-based decision lies in giving posi-
tive decisional weight to the fact that a given individual member holds a certain view. 
Instead of  delegating to a Hobbesian sovereign the resolution of  collective problems, 
majority rule accords to citizens a fair method of  decision making. It is not that the 
Hobbesian approach does not recognize disagreement, but the point is that it does 
fail to recognize the second sense of  respect, that is, the sense of  counting equally 
when choosing a solution. The authority of  law stems from the recognition of  equal 
respect and concern for citizens implied in the principle of  majority rule and the equal 
right to vote.42 The normative basis of  this conception of  authority lies in showing 
respect to citizens by treating them as autonomous reasoners.43 Authoritative direc-
tives are intended as binding not because people agree or give their consent to them, 
but because they have had a fair say in the process that led to the adoption of  the law. 
Given the conditions of  politics, equal votes and majority rule form political constitu-
tionalists’ public reason by securing the respect of  publicness in several senses (public 
rules, public scrutiny and public forum where political projects can be debated, for 
example)44 while they secure accountability through the same electoral process.45
38 Authors like Kenneth Arrow and William Riker have criticized the majoritarian aspect of  democracy on the 
basis that no aggregation rule can produce a determinate outcome while satisfying reasonable normative 
conditions. See kenneth aRRoW, social choice and individual values (1963); William RikeR, liBeRalism against 
PoPulism: a confRontation BetWeen the theoRy of democRacy and the theoRy of social choice (1982). Riker insists 
that the only rational way to understand democratic politics is to analyze the process in terms of  individu-
alistic decisions made by voters and politicians, as if  they were maximizing their own transitive preferences. 
For an empirical critique of  the Arrow-Riker position see geRRy mackie, democRacy defended 5–9 (2003).
39 david estlund, democRatic authoRity: a PhilosoPhical fRameWoRk 76–79 (2008). Henry Richardson made a 
similar example referring to a want-collation machine that registers and aggregates each person’s prefer-
ences: henRy RichaRdson, democRatic autonomy 63–64 (2002).
40 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 230.
41 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 108.
42 For a justification of  majority rule from the social choice theory perspective, see amaRtya sen, collective 
choice and social WelfaRe 71–74 (1970). The classic defense is Kenneth May, A Set of  Independent Necessary 
and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 econometRica 680 (1952).
43 RichaRdson, supra note 39, at 78–83.
44 On equal votes as a public way of  providing citizens with equal political resources, see Thomas Christiano, 
The Authority of  Democracy, 12 J. Pol. Phil. 266, 274–277 (2004).
45 tomkins, supra note 1, at 6–7.
 at Periodicals D
ept on July 19, 2013
http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
934 I•CON 10 (2012), 926–949
1.3. Neo-parliamentarism
Having established that the building block of  political constitutionalism is the idea 
of  political equality, it is still necessary to outline the constitutional values that 
this conception entails and, in particular, the institutional design that instantiates 
these values. The third tenet of  the political version of  constitutionalism supports 
the idea that all politics are constitutional. Therefore, legislative politics are always 
constitutional and exhaust, in that respect, the whole space of  public reason. At the 
level of  institutional design the crux of  the argument lies in the rejection (although 
it may be presented in different ways) of  strong judicial review.46 The embodiment 
of  such a practice in a constitutional or in a supreme court violates the principle 
of  political equality. To understand this firm rejection of  judicial review, one has 
to look at the difference between input- and output-related reasons. The latter are 
usually taken to be those authoritative reasons for designing procedures in a way 
that will ensure appropriate outcomes. This is, for example, the rationale behind 
Raz’s service conception of  authority, according to which a directive is authorita-
tive not in virtue of  the way it was enacted, but because it provides exclusionary 
reasons.47 Another example of  an outcome-related line of  thinking is John Rawls’s 
idea that the fundamental parameter for judging a procedure is given by how just 
its likely results are.48 Outcome-related reasons are reasons for adopting a proce-
dure that will secure the appropriate result; while input-related reasons insist that 
people participate in the decision independently of  considerations about the appro-
priate outcome.49
Usually, there are four arguments based on outcome reasons in support of  judicial 
review of  legislation.50 First, constitutional courts deal with individual cases and so 
they find themselves in a better position to decide on individual rights. However, by 
the time cases reach the high appellate levels, they have almost lost any trace of  the 
right holder. Therefore, the dispute takes place around quite abstract issues. The sec-
ond type of  outcome-related reasons is the reference to a bill of  rights as a constraint 
on the arbitrary power of  judicial interpretation and as an aid allowing disputants 
to focus on the abstract issues at stake. In this case, political constitutionalists have 
remarked that the constraints imposed by legal texts and precedents, given the vague-
ness inherent to language and the relative ease with which supreme courts depart 
from previous decisions, cannot be deemed to be particularly relevant. The third rea-
son concerns the fact that judicial decisions come in the form of  reason-giving. As 
Dworkin famously put it, courts are “forums of  principle.”51 But this aspect depends 
46 On the difference between strong and weak judicial review see Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth 
Model of  Constitutionalism, 49 am. J. comP. l. 707 (2001); Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of  Dialogue 
Between Judges and Legislators, 23 suP. c. l. Rev. 1, 9–21 (2004).
47 JosePh Raz, the moRality of fReedom 23–108 (1986). Raz dismisses input reasons as secondary: Joseph 
Raz, Disagreement in Politics, 43 am. J. JuRis. 25, 45–46 (1998).
48 John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice 202 (rev. edn. 1999).
49 Waldron, The Core of  the Case, supra note 3, at 1371–1372.
50 Id. at 1379–1386.
51 Ronald dWoRkin, a matteR of PRinciPle 69–71 (1985).
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on contextual institutional designs and it is by no means exclusive to judicial power. 
Nothing prevents parliaments or other political institutions from giving reasons on 
the basis of  principles. The last argument, probably the most important, is based 
on the idea that judicial review is a necessary presupposition of  the legitimacy of  
democratic processes and a remedy for certain potential drawbacks of  democratic 
decision-making.52 In particular, as output-based procedure, judicial review can 
check the risk of  majoritarianism when democracy, aggregating votes, risks sacrific-
ing individuals to collective welfare. Fundamental rights, being “individual political 
goals,” should not be subordinated to “notions of  the general interest.”53 The claim is 
that, from the point of  view of  political constitutionalists, judicial review of  legisla-
tion violates the principle of  political equality because it decides on issues of  general 
interests as rights and powers without giving to every citizen the possibility to partic-
ipate and to have a fair say in the process.54
While outcome reasons do not constitute a clear case in support of  judicial review, 
input reasons, concerning fundamentally those who participate in a process, are 
clearly, or, as the argument goes, at least in support of  voting mechanisms that give 
everyone an equal say. The only way to achieve a non-arbitrary form of  government 
lies in giving substance to people’s quality as equal political actors in some form of  
popular rule.55 On the other hand, judicial review does not comply with input reasons. 
Its adversarial institutional form, however interpreted, does not take into account, 
when deciding on rights and powers, more than two perspectives, narrowing down 
the perimeter of  deliberative communication. For political constitutionalists, the best 
way to track down the common good, so to speak, is a system of  “equal votes, majority 
rule and party competition.”56
In light of  this discussion, it turns out that the only institutional equilibrium that 
guarantees the principle of  political equality can be defined as neo-parliamentarism. 
Parliament is seen by political constitutionalists as the only institution which can 
express the plurality of  opinions and respect disagreements while at the same time 
reaching an authoritative decision. Waldron has elegantly summed up the authorita-
tive character of  the activity of  the parliament in the following terms: “the authority 
of  a law is its emergence, under specified procedures, as a ‘unum’ out of  a plurality of  
ideas, concerns, and proposals, in circumstances where we recognize a need for one 
decision made together, not many decisions made by each of  us alone.”57 As an insti-
tution, a legislative assembly is normally composed by an elevated number of  people 
52 See Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of  Judicial Review, 9 laW & Phil. 327 
(1990); chRistoPheR eisgRuBeR, constitutional self-goveRnment 46–108 (2002). See also the classic work by 
John ely, democRacy and distRust (1980).
53 Ronald dWoRkin, taking Rights seRiously 269 (1977).
54 For a critique of  this argument see Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy 
Waldron, 22 laW & Phil. 451 (2003). Aron Harel proposes a right to judicial review as a spin-off  of  the 
right to have one’s voice heard: The Right to Judicial Review, 92 viR. l. Rev. 991 (2006).
55 RichaRdson, supra note 39, at 47–48.
56 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 220.
57 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 144.
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(a feature which constitutes a guarantee against corruption and for better delibera-
tion58) and it follows the principle of  majority rule, therefore representing a real and 
balanced space for deliberation.59
1.4. The value of  ordinary politics and the rejection of  higher law
Along this line of  reasoning, we come to the last tenet which affirms that there is no 
space in political constitutionalism for a higher law or superior norms (a legal consti-
tution). If  democracy is a political process based on the principle that everybody can 
have an equal say on common issues, then any constraint or limit imposed by legal 
instruments appears as illegitimate and arbitrary over the following generations. Even 
worse, constitutionalization is equated with a process that reinforces a given elite or 
perpetuates the power of  social groups that fear that they might lose their ascendancy 
in the future.60 Even though they should probably be distinguished as different phe-
nomena, constitutionalization is deemed to be prodromic to pervasive judicialization.61
From this outline of  the legalist conception of  a constitution stems one of  the most 
challenging claims of  political constitutionalism. This claim entails a commitment 
to a particular idea of  constitution.62 The most explicit is Bellamy who affirms that 
“according to this political conception, the democratic process is the constitution. It 
is both constitutional, offering a due process, and constitutive, able to reform itself.”63 
From this perspective, constitutions cannot be considered norms or laws stricto 
sensu.64 Democracy is self-constituting and does not need superior norms to regulate 
this process, or at least, this process cannot be constrained by laws. It is not by acci-
dent that political constitutionalism does not deal with the idea of  constituent power. 
Indeed, the idea of  politics which permeates this theory does not allow for a distinc-
tion between the constitutive and the constituted. Since it is a process, democracy can 
police itself  in virtue of  the deployment of  its own logic.
In the following two sections only the second and the fourth tenet will be discussed. 
As for the first tenet, while its basic correctness is going to be acknowledged, some 
remarks will be made at the end of  this article in light of  the considerations advanced 
on political equality and the idea of  a constitution. The issue of  judicial review will 
not be discussed in much detail, but since the rejection of  judicial review is based on a 
58 This point was made by Condorcet and has been recently revived by JeRemy WaldRon, the dignity of 
legislation 32–35 (1999).
59 Parliament is also seen as the most suitable institution for political accountability: cf. Adam Tomkins, 
What Is Parliament For?, in PuBlic laW in a multi-layeRed constitution 53 (Nicholas Bamforth ed., 2003). 
On the idea of  political accountability see RichaRd mulgan, holding PoWeR to account: accountaBility in 
modeRn democRacies (2003); RoBeRt Behn, Rethinking democRatic accountaBility (2001).
60 This is the thesis proposed by Ran hiRschl, JuRistocRacy (2004).
61 On judicialization see the in-depth analysis of  alec stone sWeet, goveRning With Judges: constitutional 
Politics in euRoPe (2000).
62 Graham Maddox, A Note on the Meaning of  Constitution, 76 am. Pol. sc. Rev. 1805 (1982).
63 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 5.
64 This view of  the constitution is strikingly close to the political conception that was dominant at least until 
the beginning of  the French Revolution. See aPostolos PaPatolias, concePtion mécaniste et concePtion noRma-
tive de la constitution [Mechanistic and Normative Conceptions of  the Constitution] (2000).
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minimalist conception of  political equality, a different understanding of  this principle 
may lead to different conclusions on the legitimacy of  judicial review.
2. Public reason in political constitutionalism: Electocracy65
At the core of  the political interpretation of  constitutionalism lies a full-fledged (if  
minimal) idea of  public reason. As already remarked, this conception consists of  two 
ingredients: equal votes and majority rule. Understood in this way, public reason shall 
guarantee the two most cherished political values: political equality and accountabil-
ity. This minimal understanding of  public reason should also leave the public space 
open to the inclusion of  other voices and the emergence of  new issues of  discussion. 
In other words, this thin conception recognizes the fact that public reasoning shapes 
and regulates public debate, but it must also be grounded by that very debate. This 
allows challenges to received or established reasons that are counted among public 
reason while, at the same time, the fact that disagreement in public reason is part and 
parcel of  the “imagination and creativity”66 immanent to politics is taken properly 
into account.
On this point a political conception of  public reason differs sharply from its legal 
counterpart. For legal constitutionalists, there are pre-political features that constrain 
public reasoning. Fundamental rights, for example, are deemed pre-political in their 
nature and they represent a limit on majority rule. On certain issues, a sort of  general 
consensus can be achieved after proper deliberation and exposure to public debate. 
Once a conclusion is reached, these issues are placed beyond reasonable disagree-
ment. To understand the split between political and legal conceptions of  public rea-
son, it is quite instructive to focus on Bellamy’s and Waldron’s critique of  Rawls’s idea 
of  it.67 Public reason, according to Rawls, is limited to “constitutional essentials” and 
matters of  basic justice.68 The conceptual setting for Rawls’s construction of  public 
reason is the original position. Through this device, citizens endowed with dual moral 
power (a sense of  justice and a conception of  the good) and deprived of  the knowledge 
of  their own social and economic status,69 choose two principles of  justice on which 
two rational agents can apparently reach an agreement. It is easier and more probable 
that individuals placed in the original position will find “a shared point of  view” in the 
65 I borrow the term from Lani Guinier, Beyond Electrocacy: Rethinking the Political Representative as Powerful 
Stranger, 71 mod. l. Rev. 1 (2008).
66 Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberations, 30 san diego l. Rev. 838 (1993).
67 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 184–188; WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 
1, at 149–163.
68 John RaWls, Political liBeRalism 214 (2d edn. 2006). This is how Rawls defines these two ideas in the 
revised version of  the idea of  public reason: “Constitutional essentials concern questions about what 
political rights and liberties, say, may reasonably be included in a written constitution, when assuming 
the constitution may be interpreted by a supreme court, or some similar body. Matters of  basic justice 
relate to the basic structure of  society and so would concern questions of  basic and social justice and 
other things not covered by a constitution” (id. at 442 n 7).
69 Id. at 23–25.
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principles of  justice and, since constitutional essentials have to be designed “to choose 
the most effective just constitution,”70 the same principles will constitute guiding out-
put reasons. For Rawls, in a well-ordered polity, citizens legitimately expect their rep-
resentatives to act and decide according to the idea of  public reason. Although Rawls 
concedes that the Supreme Court is not the only possible seat of  public reason,71 traces 
of  his legalistic understanding of  public reason are disseminated throughout his texts. 
The test Rawls proposes to adopt as a way of  checking whether a citizen is acting 
according to the idea of  public reason is quite telling: we should ask “how would our 
argument strike us presented in the form of  a supreme court opinion?”72
On the view of  political constitutionalists, Rawlsian public reason does not take dis-
agreement seriously because it already filters some of  its more unsettling expressions 
through an idealized procedure.73 Rawls’s words seem to corroborate the following 
remark: “the idea of  right and just constitutions and basic laws is always ascertained 
by the most reasonable political conception of  justice and not by the result of  an actual 
political process.”74 Effectively, the price to be paid for the removal of  constitutional 
politics in designing constitutional essentials is high. Rawls’s method of  building pub-
lic reason “has struck all but its supporters as either too indeterminate to produce its 
favoured conclusions, or somewhat circular—building its results into its premises.”75 
Despite its numerous references to a political conception of  liberalism, the idea of  pub-
lic reason’s weakest aspect is precisely to be found in the absence, in Rawls’s account, 
of  any concrete political process. In that sense, Rawls “depoliticizes” public reason and 
insulates constitutional essentials from possible channels of  contestation.76 Overall, 
we are told by political constitutionalists, Rawls’s public reason is the practice of  a 
reason where conflict is reduced as primarily involving doctrines and overcome by 
resorting to a device that enables the emergence of  consensus.77
The problem is that, while partially correct, this critique may also be applied, to a 
certain extent, to political constitutionalists themselves. One of  the crucial omissions 
from the original position is the absence of  the recognition that any given society inev-
itably carries a historical legacy as part of  its identity. This legacy, which comprises sev-
eral relations of  power, defines the conditions of  those who find themselves engaged 
with political processes. The solution, according to political constitutionalists, is to 
frame an authoritative procedure which allows for a politics of  the will to solve the 
70 RaWls, a theoRy of Justice, supra note 48, at 198.
71 RaWls, Political liBeRalism, supra note 68, at 240.
72 Id., at 254.
73 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 158.
74 RaWls, Political liBeRalism, supra note 68, at 233.
75 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 185.
76 To be fair, in the revised version of  his conception of  public reason, Rawls admits that “political liberal-
ism, then, does not try to fix public reason once and for all in the form of  one favored political concep-
tion of  justice. . . . Even if  relatively few conceptions come to dominate over time, and one conception 
even appears to have a special central place, the forms of  permissible public reason are always several. 
Moreover, new variations maybe proposed from time to time and older ones may cease to be represented”: 
Political liBeRalism, supra note 68, at 451–452.
77 Sheldon Wolin, The Liberal/Democratic Divide. On Political Liberalism, 24 Pol. theoRy 97, 108 (1996).
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question of  disagreement. But a description of  the formation of  such a will as a cycle 
of  elections regulated by majority rule strikes us as largely incomplete. Presented in an 
abstract way as basic principles, majority rule and equal votes can be easily manipu-
lated, while being formally respected. Take, for example, the case of  a state that, after a 
long period of  dictatorship, comes to adopt some form of  parliamentary democracy. It 
will be required to organize electoral districts and to enact electoral laws. At this stage, 
given the historical context of  the country, it is possible to manipulate these elements 
in such a manner as to favor a specific outcome and to invalidate the principle that the 
minimum weight of  a citizens’ vote counts equally. One here may note that political 
constitutionalists are not making a universal argument because they recognize that 
their approach is applicable only in contexts where (a) there are democratic institu-
tions already in place, (b) a well-functioning judicial power, (c) a general commitment 
to rights from the part of  the relevant population, and (d) a reasonable disagreement 
about rights.78 But it is quite clear that these assumptions secure the input-based 
approach of  political constitutionalism from unwelcome outcomes. This move comes 
at a high price as well: these constraints look very similar to Rawls’s account of  politi-
cal culture in Political Liberalism and weaken the strength of  the argument by ignoring 
the issue of  how (that is, according to which kind of  reasons) to set up the procedures 
required by input reasons. Moreover, political constitutionalists would probably be 
committed to other important values which are entailed in the idea of  a majoritar-
ian democracy, such as freedom of  expression and freedom of  association—themes 
that have not been properly developed until now. An important part of  this article’s 
aim is to underline the impoverished nature of  the description of  representative poli-
tics, which, even in its parliamentary style,79 has not been fully discussed by political 
constitutionalists.80
2.1. Voting and judging
In light of  previous considerations, the act of  voting needs to be placed in a more com-
plex setting which takes into account the formal and informal processes that shape 
the will as expressed in the very act.81 This broader setting deals with public opinion 
and ideas, which are usually shaped, according to Hannah Arendt, by the activity of  
judging.82 While the will is the most individualistic and particularistic of  the human 
faculties, judgment is constitutively inter-subjective. This means that its emergence 
is due to the interaction and communication between citizens. The capacity to judge 
78 These are the four assumptions stressed by Waldron, The Core of  the Case, supra note 3, at 1359–1368.
79 For a powerful analysis see Kari Palonen, Parliamentarism: A Politics of  Temporal and Rhetorical Distances, 
15 ÖsteRReische zeitschRift füR geschichtsWissenschaften 111 (2000).
80 Waldron explicitly recognizes it: see laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 10.
81 Quite interestingly, Rawls has urged to rethink the act of  voting when he affirms that “the ideal of  public 
reason not only govern the public discourse of  elections . . . but also how citizens are to cast their vote”: 
Political liBeRalism, supra note 68, at 215.
82 hannah aRendt, lectuRes on kant’s Political PhilosoPhy (1982); see also Ronald BeineR & JennifeR nedelsky 
eds., Judgment, imagination and Politics: themes fRom kant and aRendt (2001); Ronald BeineR, Political 
Judgment (2009); alessandRo feRRaRa, Justice and Judgment (2000).
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the actions of  representatives is essential for political accountability and it proves that 
voting does not entail the delegation of  every power to elected politicians. Therefore, 
a more accurate account of  how representative politics works ought to consider the 
role of  political judgment. Voting is one of  the most important ways of  keeping the 
government under control and holding officials accountable, but this is possible only 
if  it is taken to be the expression of  an aptly formed judgment. Recognizing the link 
between will and judgment entails understanding the act of  voting as part of  a larger 
constellation of  political activities that are critical to the shaping of  public opinion.
Nadia Urbinati and Pierre Rosanvallon,83 among others, have correctly identified 
this “negative power” that explains what happens between two elections. From a 
political perspective, what happens before and after an election ought to be deemed 
extremely relevant. Elections remain a pivotal moment in political life, because 
there are no other reasonable alternatives to voting for deciding future plans, but 
to understand their value one needs to look beyond the pure electoral moment of  
casting a ballot. Seen from this perspective, electors, more than citizens, seem to 
be at the forefront of  political constitutionalists’ concerns. In that respect, political 
constitutionalists come closer to supporters of  the so-called “minimalist conception 
of  democracy.”84 This is a view powerfully advocated, for example, by Robert Dahl, 
according to whom elections prevent civil war because losers know they will have 
another chance in the next elections.85 Bellamy, adding further nuances to the argu-
ment, states that “the key determinants of  political equality so conceived are that 
rule of  the people be by the people according to some mechanism that gives them all 
an equal say,” which implies that “citizens hav[e] an equal vote in common elections 
where political parties compete for the people’s vote and electoral and legislative deci-
sions are made by majority rule.”86 The dynamism of  the political process guarantees 
the participatory conditions of  equal concern and respect and therefore secures the 
non-arbitrary nature of  political rule.87
2.2. The dangers of  ordinary politics
The emphasis on a political process based on horizontal separation of  powers where 
parties are the main competing actors may entail some risks.88 One of  these is that 
such a conception confuses aristocracy and elected representatives by giving the 
representatives a period of  time during which they become isolated and independent 
from the citizenry. In that way, elected officials may become a sort of  political clergy. 
Another risk is underestimating the fact that leaving to a concrete democratic political 
83 nadia uRBinati, RePResentative democRacy (2006); PieRRe Rosanvallon, Politics in an age of distRust (2008).
84 Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of  Democracy: A Defense, in democRacy’s value 23 (Ian Shapiro & 
Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).
85 RoBeRt dahl, democRacy and its cRitiques (1989).
86 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 219.
87 On non-arbitrary rule see PhiliP Pettit, RePuBlicanism 183–186 (1997).
88 For an analysis of  American constitutionalism based on competition between political parties see Daryl 
Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of  Parties, not Powers, 119 haRv. l. Rev. 2311 (2006).
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process the task of  policing itself  may indeed entrench established conditions. In that 
sense, not only counter-majoritarian institutions are biased towards the status quo. 
It is true, for example, that in the case of  electoral law, constitutional courts have a 
tendency to consolidate the status quo,89 but the same often happens to political parties 
that are usually interested in maintaining and even fostering a determinate political 
framework. Well established political parties do not have an interest in letting other 
alternative voices enter the political process. The territorial organization of  politi-
cal representation constitutes a good example of  this exclusive logic. The practice of  
drawing up districts along the lines of  race or class or religion in order to control in 
advance who is going to be elected (known as gerrymandering) is just one of  the pos-
sible forms of  legislative self-entrenchment in clear violation of  the principle of  politi-
cal equality.90 Political constitutionalists seem to underestimate this kind of  problem 
because they adopt a rather “dry” idea of  representative democracy. Party competi-
tion and majority rule do not provide sufficient criteria for judging if  elections respect 
the principle of  political equality.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that in the political constitutionalists’ 
scheme representatives look like surrogates, rather than dynamic partners of  the 
citizenry, who have the privilege of  acting on a vague mandate obtained the day of  
their election, while bearing in mind that from time to time they have to be account-
able to the electorate.91 But the concept of  a free mandate does not imply that rep-
resentatives are completely detached from their constituencies. On the contrary, 
one of  the reasons behind this freedom is that representatives are able to discuss 
and deliberate by persuading and being persuaded by others in the assembly. Thus 
elections do prevent civil war not only because they are cyclical, but also because 
they put in motion a process that continuously shapes the opinions of  the repre-
sentatives and of  the citizens. Those who have lost the last general election can 
still count on the possibility that they will be able to influence the formation of  the 
will through institutional and informal means of  social and political control.92 The 
fact that a political system endures despite divisions between the majority and the 
minorities often means that conflict and the procedure to regulate it are not the only 
means of  integration,93 but that the formation of  public opinion constitutes another 
important bond.
89 Classically, this has been the case of  the Supreme Court, which has been slowly developing a theory of  
democracy that emphasizes order and stability over competition: Richard Pildes, The Constitutionalization 
of  Democratic Politics, 118 haRv. l. Rev. 4, 28 (2004).
90 Id., 59–60. See generally Daniel Lowenstein, Associational Rights of  Major Political Parties: A Skeptical 
Inquiry, 71 tex. l. Rev. 1741 (1993) (noting the role that the major parties have in structuring access to 
government).
91 For an examination of  political representation applied to Waldron’s theory see Dimitrios Kyritsis, 
Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review, 26 oxfoRd J. legal. stud. 733 (2006).
92 Rosanvallon, supra note 823, at 84–85.
93 The idea that conflict works as an integrative force in social and political groups is quite common in 
political philosophy, at least since Machiavelli. See, e.g., Albert Hirschman, Social Conflicts as Pillars of  
Democratic Market Society, 22 Pol. theoRy 208 (1994).
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Urbinati aptly summarizes this view in the following way:
focusing on voting as the temporary resolution of  political conflict tells us the location of  
authorized “will” to make laws but does not provide us with the complete picture of  the demo-
cratic game that puts that will in motion and shapes it.94
Once the formation of  the will is understood from the perspective of  judgment, the 
neat separation between input and output reasons needs to be revised. It may still 
make sense to separate input and output reasons for heuristic purposes, but if  we want 
to take both democracy and disagreement seriously we have to become aware that an 
authoritative majoritarian procedure does not conclude the relevant political process. 
Quite the contrary: the formation and the activity of  public opinion is always at work. 
There is a before and an after whose importance, compared to the act of  voting, cannot 
be ranked as secondary. Political constitutionalists should recognize that the principle 
of  political equality makes sense only to the extent that one takes into account the fact 
that votes are casted in a historically defined context.
In light of  these remarks, the ideal of  political equality needs to be re-described with 
a Janus-like profile. Voting (and, accordingly, the principle of  majority rule) is surely 
critical for the democratic justification of  the constitutional order, but it by no means 
exhausts the whole democratic process. Democratic sovereignty, if  one can resort to 
this term, must be conceived in a way that can explain the idea that the citizenry do 
not delegate everything on the day of  the election, but they retain power to investi-
gate, judge, and control their representatives. Such a negative power fits well with a 
doctrine that puts so much emphasis on disagreement. However, it is surprising to see 
how little attention political constitutionalists have paid to alternative channels for 
expressing this kind of  negative power.
One might think, for example, of  several institutional and non-institutional devices 
to give voice to these other moments that shape the constitutional life of  democracy. 
Given that political institutions do not exhaust the possible interactions between poli-
tics and society,95 the representative character of  institutions should be extended 
beyond the electoral process in order to facilitate a dialogue between representatives 
and citizens.96 Without providing a fully exhaustive account of  what these channels 
of  communication might be, it is enough to consider the role of  social movements in 
the exercise of  citizens’ negative power, and in particular how valuable civil disobe-
dience can be for a theory based on disagreement.97 Another interesting example is 
represented by the use of  referendums as a tool which allows segments of  civil society 
to express their concerns about an issue which has already been dealt with by political 
94 uRBinati, supra note 83, at 29.
95 andReW aRato & Jean cohen, civil society and Political theoRy (1995).
96 I do not tackle with another different issue concerning the representative character of  unelected institu-
tions. For an introduction to the topic, see maRk viBeRt, the Rise of the unelected (2007).
97 Unexpectedly, political constitutionalists have not dealt with the issue of  civil disobedience, a topic which 
certainly relates to the question of  disagreement. See, for an interesting interpretation, Besson, supra note 
18, at 503–524.
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institutions.98 By challenging a certain legal act, referendums can bring a topic to the 
fore of  public discussion and force political institutions to take it into account or to 
reconsider the way they decided on it.
3. Beyond elitism: The democratic value of  constitutional 
politics
At this point of  the analysis, it should not come as a surprise that political constitutional-
ists reject the idea of  constitutional law as higher law. The first reason behind this refusal 
has to do with the general depiction of  law by proponents of  political constitutional-
ism. Law is either an instrument for implementing political decisions or a constraint 
on political action. This skepticism (not so different from that of  legal realism) infuses 
political constitutionalists’ attitude toward constitutional law. In the first case, this con-
ception of  the law leads to a decisionist and often irrational portrait of  the relationship 
between law and politics. The second conception shares with liberal constitutionalism 
the idea that law is always a limit imposed on freedom for the sake of  freedom itself. 
Obviously, this is an understanding of  freedom based on purely negative grounds (free-
dom as non-interference).99 But the point is that political constitutionalists, by accepting 
this definition of  constitutional law, that is, by denying certain architectural features 
of  constitutional law that make it constitutive of  common good,100 come to propose a 
minimalist idea of  political freedom and to accept the liberal view on the nature of  law.
The second reason behind the rejection of  a legal conception of  the constitution is 
given by the refusal of  the idea of  different levels of  politics, that is, of  a more intense 
and participate form of  political action which might affect the constitutional frame-
work. But since for political constitutionalists all politics is constitutional, and ordi-
nary politics marks the beginning and the end of  the spectrum of  political action, the 
anchoring of  the superior validity of  constitutional norms in the special character of  
constitutional politics is unacceptable.
From these two assumptions the idea emerges of  constitutional law as an attempt 
to lock-in elites who fear the possibility that in the near future they may be over-
turned. A clear example of  this approach is the thesis of  the so-called juristocracy, 
as notoriously put forward by Ran Hirschl.101 There is no intention to deny that some 
instances of  recent constitutionalization amounted effectively to a form of  “heg-
emonic preservation” of  certain social groups.102 But the protection of  elites is not 
98 For an inquiry on the practice of  referendums, see laWRence leduc, the Politics of diRect democRacy: 
RefeRendums in gloBal PeRsPective (2003); matt qvoRtRuP, a comPaRative study of RefeRendums: goveRnment 
By the PeoPle (2005).
99 This was the conception of  law advocated, for example, by Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. See 
Pettit, supra note 87, at 41–44; quentin skinneR, hoBBes and RePuBlican liBeRty (2008).
100 For the classic statement of  constitutionalism as constitutio libertatis, see aRendt, on Revolution, supra note 
17, at 141–178. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Arendt’s Constitutional Politics, in the camBRidge comPanion to aRendt 
201 (Dana Villa ed., 2000).
101 hiRschl, JuRistocRacy, supra note 60.
102 On the modern dilemma connected to constituent power and constitutionalization see maRtin loughlin & 
neil WalkeR eds., the PaRadox of constitutionalism: constituent PoWeR and constitutional foRm (2007).
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necessarily undertaken constitutionally. Other strategies of  entrenchment are pos-
sible. For example, these can be pursued through political and/or economic means. 
Furthermore, nothing proves that constitutionalization is constitutively linked to a 
form of  entrenchment of  the privileged. It mostly depends on where the process of  
constitutionalization starts from (to simplify, whether from the top or from the bottom) 
and who the main actors are.
An enticing image illustrates vividly how constitutional law would work as a form 
of  entrenchment of  the elite. Legal constitutionalists and social scientists have often 
relied on the story of  Ulysses and the Sirens to provide an analogy for constitutional 
legitimacy. The problems with the now discredited Ulysses metaphor are twofold. 
First, the metaphor compares the constitution to the ropes that Ulysses used to bind 
himself  to the mast of  his ship in order to hear the music of  the Sirens without suc-
cumbing to temptation. It is a classic act of  self-binding or precommitment,103 which 
is based on the superior claim of  rationality of  a certain group of  people at one point 
in time against the less rational people at another point in time (allegedly a moment 
where the agent will be less rational and more prone to acting on the basis of  desires 
or passions). The problem with this metaphor is that by tying himself  to the mast, 
Ulysses’ action does not provide any reason to act or not to act.104 The ropes explain 
why Ulysses resists to the call of  the Sirens and stays on board, but they are not his 
reason for staying. In other words, Ulysses does not give himself  a reason for resisting 
to the Sirens.
Waldron’s harsh critique of  Jon Elster’s idea of  constitutions as pre-commitments 
illustrates the repulsion toward the very idea of  higher law as intended in this 
pre-commitment fashion.105 On the whole, political constitutionalists believe that a 
constitution is, first of  all, a political process and not a norm. This conception of  a 
constitution as either a norm or a process betrays, however, a misunderstanding of  
the nature of  the higher law and an implausible reading of  the workings of  political 
institutions. The latter certainly do not operate in a vacuum, but they have to respect 
some already established rules if  they want to produce outcomes.106 In fact, there is 
a risk of  giving the impression that political action can stream out of  nothing. In this 
way, constitutional law is reduced, as famously argued by John Griffith, to “what hap-
pens.”107 In other words, this approach may end up adopting an almost functional-
ist stance on constitutionalism and reducing its normativity to a bare minimum. Or 
to even less than that, since political constitutionalists seem ready to accept the idea 
103 Jon elsteR, ulysses and the siRens (1980).
104 Jed RuBenfeld, fReedom and time 117 (2001).
105 WaldRon, laW and disagReement, supra note 1, at 255–281.
106 Political institutions can change the rules that they are following, for example in order to enact laws; but 
to be able to proceed, they have to comply with the rules that regulate their behaviors for at least another 
time. A parliament willing to change its own internal regulations must follow the same regulations it 
intends to abolish or transform.
107 John Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 mod. l. Rev. 1, 22 (1978). For a different reading of  Griffith’s 
classic article see Thomas Poole, Truth and Illusion in “The Political Constitution”, 70 mod. l. Rev. 253, 
253–254 (2007). Cf. Graham Gee, The Political Constitutionalism of  J. Griffith, 28 legal stud. 20 (2008).
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that representative democracy and majority rule can be followed by a decision taken 
according to the same democratic process they are supposed to constitute.108 This per-
spective may be defined, loosely, as a sort of  “absolute democracy,” where in every 
decision everything, unrealistically, is always up for grabs.
3.1. The multiple layers of  politics
One of  the weak aspects of  this theory, however, can be found precisely in its conception 
of  the political that it conveys. Politics is portrayed as arising from nothing in an uncon-
strained and literally unlimited realm. This account does not take into appropriate con-
sideration the fragility of  the political realm where action is supposed to take place.109 
While political constitutionalists recognize the two basic features of  the political condi-
tion, they fail to dig deeper in order to extrapolate a more accurate description of  politi-
cal action. In this sense, a closer reading of  Arendt’s writings on the political may turn 
out as particularly appropriate in this context.110 Political action does not occur in a 
vacuum. Even when, to resort to a typical Arendtian jargon, it brings about a new begin-
ning, political action does not operate in an unbounded way, but it always takes place in 
a world (in the Arendtian sense of  the word).111 The worldly feature of  political action 
imposes a temporal-extended conception which entails a before and an after.112 Part of  
the aim of  political action is precisely to maintain and to renovate the common world 
shared by men. Avoiding this aspect of  reality means idealizing the circumstances of  
politics. The fact that “men inhabit this earth” does not have to be read only in a horizon-
tal manner, that is, as if  plurality were generated only by those who are physically pres-
ent at a particular moment, but it should be understood also as extending over time. This 
extended dominion of  political action is either ignored or, when recognized, downplayed 
by political constitutionalists. Indeed, the idea that democracy is a constitutive and at 
the same time constituted process seems to summon a vulgar Rousseavian understand-
ing of  collective autonomy.113 Some passages from the first draft of  the Contrat Social, 
written in Geneva, exemplify this attitude: “Now the general will that should direct the 
State is not that of  a past time but of  the present moment, and the true characteristic 
of  sovereignty is that there is always agreement on time, place and effect between the 
direction of  the general will and the use of  public force.”114 According to this logic, a 
108 Thomas Christiano has noted that on a normative level it does not make sense to say that a democratic 
decision can abolish representative democracy: the constitution of equality 28 (2008).
109 hannah aRendt, the human condition 199–206 (1958).
110 In that respect, see the interesting distinction between extraordinary, semi-extraordinary and ordinary 
politics put forward by andReas kalyvas, democRacy and the Politics of the extRaoRdinaRy (2008).
111 On the concept of  world in Arendt see maRgaRet canovan, hannah aRendt. a ReinteRPRetation of heR 
Political thought 105–112 (1992).
112 On the temporal dimension inherent to parliamentarism, see Palonen, supra note 79; Jane Mansbridge, 
Rethinking Representation, 97 am. Pol. sci. Rev. 515 (2003).
113 This does not intend to be a precise description of  Rousseau’s philosophy, but only a reference to what 
is considered normally a Rousseauvian argument. For a different interpretation of  Rousseau see Judith 
shklaR, men and citizens: a study of Rousseau’s social theoRy (1969).
114 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the social contRact oR essay aBout the foRm of the RePuBlic (geneva manuscRiPt) 
168 (R.D. Masters ed., 1978), quoted by Rubenfeld, supra note 104, at 17.
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democratic or self-governing polity should not be governed by laws enacted in the past, 
but should leave political decisions to the present generation.115 Even when political 
constitutionalists recognize that a constitutional democracy may be influenced by its 
past, they minimize this aspect by affirming that “if  constitutions are simply artifacts of  
democracy, though, it seems difficult to accord them any independent weight.”116
3.2. Constitutionalization as the outcome of  constitutional politics
As a final point, one needs to observe that political constitutionalists only see one aspect 
of  the higher-lawmaking process. They tend to emphasize the entrenchment-effect 
of  higher law and, at the same time, they rightly stress the role of  normal politics 
in bringing about social changes. However, this view sometimes appears to be par-
tial and parochial.117 Multiple analyses of  the effects of  new constitutionalism on the 
socio-economic structures of  Western countries have defined constitutionalization 
as tantamount to “hegemonic preservation” or “constitutional protection of  capi-
talism.”118 These judgements should not be quickly discarded, because most of  the 
times they have been proven to be correct. The problem is that they do not distinguish 
between different processes of  constitutionalization.119 Not every instance of  constitu-
tionalization has been realized through judicial power alone.
Historical and theoretical arguments seem to point to a more nuanced evaluation 
of  the link between constitutionalization and entrenchment of  privileges. From a his-
torical point of  view, processes of  constitutionalization have not always been synony-
mous with conservative outcomes. The contrary is true: one of  the main differences 
between ancient and modern constitutionalism120 should be seen in the revolutionary 
potential that is attached to the modern.121 This aspect should not be overlooked, since 
even liberal constitutionalism generally concedes that there is a layer of  constituent 
power that cannot be completely tamed by the principle of  legality.122 In that sense, 
constitutional politics can open new channels for unheard voices. Furthermore, in 
countries where constitutions have been enacted after the collapse of  a despotic or 
115 The sovereignty of  the generation is a common theme for thinkers of  the Enlightenment such as Adam 
Smith, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson. See, on this topic, sheldon Wolin, Politics and vision 311 
(1960).
116 Bellamy, Political constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 123.
117 Some of  the arguments on the debate on judicial review bring with them this parochial mark, as noted, 
recently, by Mark Tushnet, How Different Are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases For and Against Judicial 
Review?, 30 oxfoRd J. legal stud. 49 (2010).
118 See also Michael Mandel, A Brief  History of  the New-Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything so 
that Everything Would Remain the Same”, 32 isR. l. Rev. 250 (1998).
119 For an inquiry into the meaning of  the process of  constitutionalization see Martin Loughlin, What Is 
Constitutionalization?, in the tWilight of constitutionalism: demise oR tRansmutation? 47 (Martin Loughlin & 
Petra Dobner eds., 2010).
120 See chaRles mcillWain, constitutionalism ancient and modeRn (1940).
121 A paradigmatic work is, of  course, aRendt, on Revolution, supra note 17, at 161–164. Cf. Jason fRank, 
constituent moments. enacting the PeoPle in PostRevolutionaRy ameRica 41–66 (2010).
122 claude klein, théoRie et PRatique du PouvoiR constituant [Theory and Practice of  the Constituent Power] 
(1995).
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totalitarian government, higher law has sometimes played a completely different role, 
preventing (or at least hindering) the re-emergence of  certain authoritarian institu-
tional models.123
From a theoretical perspective, the idea of  a major change in the political and civil 
landscapes through constitutional transformations brings us back to the idea that 
political decisions have the same value and strength. A transformation of  a funda-
mental aspect of  the polity (the repudiation of  slavery, for example) does not have the 
monothematic and therefore narrow scope attributed to it by political constitutional-
ists. A major change of  such relevance affects several areas of  social and political life. 
To stick with the example of  slavery, the declaration of  its unconstitutionality does 
not only impact the freedom of  citizens, but brings about other major changes in the 
social and economic realms. In order to achieve such a complex transformation, a 
deep and lasting constitutional process is necessary. Winning one general election may 
trigger the adoption of  some new laws, but it will rarely be enough to transform, in the 
short term, people’s attitudes towards certain fundamental issues.124 Of  course, this 
does not prevent the engine of  constitutional transformation from being legislative 
politics125 which are often included in processes of  constitutional change. However, a 
constitutional transformation is not only a change in constitutional law, but a change 
in the way a polity understands itself. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that constitu-
tional politics should have three characteristics (which may also belong to ordinary 
politics, but not as an essential feature): depth, breadth, and decisiveness. The latter 
requirement cuts through the Condorcet paradoxes because the content of  a proposal 
of  constitutional change should be in a position to decisively defeat all the plausible 
alternatives.126 In order to meet this requirement, that is, to be a Condorcet-winner, 
for a movement more than one election might be required. It should also win over 
the resistances of  other forces of  the modern state (bureaucracy and the judiciary, 
among others) and, in substance, convince the institutions that it unsettles to accept 
the transformation as legitimate.127
Since it touches upon “constitutional essentials” (and this is what is at stake in this 
debate, i.e., the formation of  public reason), constitutional politics concerns not only 
lawyers and politicians, but also civic and popular cultures.128 This is another reason 
why changing some constitutional essentials of  a polity calls for a huge and prolonged 
political effort.
123 It is not by chance that the discourse on constitutional patriotism first arose in Germany, and then in Italy 
and Spain. See Jan-WeRneR mülleR, constitutional PatRiotism (2007).
124 But for an interesting analysis of  the subconstitutional value of  some initially ordinary statutes see W. 
eskRidge & J. feReJohn, a RePuBlic of statutes (2010).
125 A completely different strategy is to try to transform the constitution by changing its interpretation. 
This move entails the blurring of  the difference between enacting and interpreting laws. See Reva Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: the Case of  the De Facto ERA, 94 
cal. l. Rev. 1323 (2006).
126 BRuce ackeRman, We the PeoPle: foundations 275–277 (1991).
127 RichaRdson, supra note 39, at 69.
128 For the definition of  these realms see Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women’s Movement, 94 cal. l. Rev. 
1421 (2006).
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One of  the great advantages of  this process has to be seen in its inclusivity. The prob-
lem with what has been called electocracy is that it does not take into account some 
important avenues of  contestability and participation outside institutional channels. 
Constitutional politics aims at opening up more formal and informal channels for 
citizens. As such, it represents a philosophical commitment to the lawmaking force 
of  meaningful participatory democracy.129 Civic, popular, and legal cultures should 
also have their voices heard, and the combinations between them may yield import-
ant insights into the political process.130 The separation of  powers, intertwined with 
representative politics, may provide multiple forums for “hearing the other side”131 
and as such it can avoid any sweeping transformation which is not followed by a paral-
lel change in the majority of  the relevant population. Constitutional transformation 
through political process presupposes a major change in popular and civic culture.132 
This kind of  transformation should not necessarily be reduced to a top-down process, 
as is the case for other judicial or executive-driven changes. It is often pointed out that 
this is the risk presented by social movements and political activity which take place 
outside parliament: the political agenda becomes monothematic. But, once again, 
the depth and length of  constitutional politics require collective groups to reflect not 
only on the principles or changes they are putting forward, but also on the impact 
that a constitutional transformation will have on several legal and political domains. 
Moreover, the claims of  collective groups may fruitfully be engaged with by politi-
cal parties and become the subject of  a dialogue between political institutions and 
civil society. This kind of  constitutional politics would not be marked simply as the 
entrenchment of  certain elites, but as a more inclusive political process.
Conclusion
Of  the most relevant issues to be discussed within political constitutionalism, the con-
ception of  politics is probably the most urgent. Indeed, for a theory whose most press-
ing claim is to revive the political aspect of  constitutionalism this represents more 
than a marginal issue. While political constitutionalists might be right in locating 
the engine of  processes of  constitutionalization or of  constitutional transformation 
within the political realm, they have not fully exploited the potential of  politics. Instead 
of  exploring the political constitution, they shut down politics altogether. This flaw 
becomes quite evident in their conception of  political equality. This principle seems 
to be guaranteed by majority rule and a political life run by political parties. But once 
the idea of  political equality is expanded in order to account for a temporal-extended 
129 A similar commitment, but limited to the relation between social movements and courts, animates Lani 
Guinier, Demosprudence through Dissent, 122 haRv. l. Rev. 4 (2008).
130 See the work of  laRRy kRameR, the PeoPle themselves: PoPulaR constitutionalism and Judicial RevieW (2004).
131 Pettit, supra note 87, at 189.
132 Quite interestingly, Tomkins’s historical account of  how the Parliament became the locus of  sovereignty 
during the seventeenth century is quite close to the description of  a constitutional moment: tomkins, ouR 
RePuBlican constitution, supra note 1, at 67–114.
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conception of  political action, some of  the assumptions of  political constitutionalists 
no longer hold. The rejection of  constitutional law as higher law is based precisely on 
this mono-dimensional conception of  politics. However, understood as the outcomes 
of  struggles which define the fundamental principles or norms of  a polity (its public 
reason) and, at the same time, as laws open to challenges and contestation, constitu-
tions (and constitutional politics) can still represent the highest and most important 
of  political dimensions.
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